Logics Over MIPC by Bezhanishvili, Guram & Zakharyaschev, Michael
Title Logics Over MIPC
Author(s)Bezhanishvili, Guram; Zakharyaschev, Michael








Guram Bezhanishvili and Michael Zakharyaschev
School of Information Science, JAIST,
Tatsunokuchi, Ishikawa 923-12, Japan;
II. Mathematisches Institut, FU Berlin,
Arnimallee 3, 14195 Berlin, Germany
( $\mathrm{e}$-mails: guram@jaist.ac.jp, mishaz@math. $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}$-berlin.de)
1 Introduction
This paper presents a number of simple observations concerning completeness theory
for normal logics containing the well-known modal intuitionistic propositional calculus
MIPC of Prior [12] and Bull [2].
There are at least two main sources of interest to MIPC and its extensions. First,
as was shown by Prior [12] and Bull [2], MIPC may be regarded as the fragment of
predicate intuitionistic logic with only one variable. According to Wajsberg [16], the
one-variable fragment of predicate classical logic is Lewis’ S5, while Ono and Suzuki
[10, 11, 15] proved that there is a continuum of logics between MIPC and S5 which
are the one-variable fragments of predicate intermediate (or superintuitionistic) logics.
On the other hand, MIPC may be considered as an intuitionistic formalization of S5
(see e.g. [12, 2, 5]).
The general aim of our current investigation is to develop a completeness theory for
logics over MIPC comparable to that for intermediate logics or normal extensions of
S4. Although there is a certain similarity between all these three types of logics, those
above $\grave{\mathrm{M}}$IPC turn out to be much more complex, witness, for instance, the fact that
the 1-generated universal frame for MIPC contains infinitely many points of depth 1
(while finitely generated refined frames for Int and even K4 have only finitely many
points of finite depth).
In this paper we report on a few first results of the project. Our main concern here
is the relation between the finite model property and completeness of a logic, on the
one hand, and the depth and width of its frames, on the other.
1021 1997 86-95 86
2 MIPC
Denote by $\mathcal{L}$ the propositional language with countably many variables $p_{1},p_{2},$ $\ldots$ and
the connectives $\wedge,$ $,$ $arrow,$ $\perp^{1}$, and let the modal language $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ result from $\mathcal{L}$ by
enriching it with the modal operators $\square$ and O. Intuitionistic modal logic MIPC is
the minimal set of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-formulas containing all the axioms of intuitionistic propositional
logic Int, the modal axioms
(A1) $\square parrow p$ $parrow \mathrm{O}p$
(A2) $\square (parrow q)arrow(\square parrow\square q)$ $\mathrm{O}(p\vee q)arrow(\mathrm{O}p\vee \mathrm{O}q)$
(A3) $\mathrm{O}parrow\square \mathrm{O}p$ $\mathrm{O}\square parrow\square p$
(A4) $\square (parrow q)arrow(\mathrm{O}parrow \mathrm{O}q)$
and closed under substitution, modus ponens and necessitation $(\varphi/\square \varphi)$ .
A set of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-formulas containing MIPC and closed under the above mentioned
inference rules will be called in this paper an intuitionistic modal logic (over MIPC)
or simply an $im$-logic. NExtMIPC (normal extensions of MIPC) is the family of all
such logics. (More generally, the set of normal extensions of a logic $L$ is denoted by
NExt $L;\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ is the set of all superintuitionistic propositional logics.) The minimal
intuitionistic modal logic containing a logic $L\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}$ and a set of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-formulas
$\Gamma$ is denoted by $L\oplus\Gamma$ .
Simple syntactic arguments (the same as in classical modal logic) show that the
family NExtMIPC with the $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\cap \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\oplus \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ a complete algebraic distributive
lattice in which intersection distributes over infinite sums
$L \cap\bigoplus_{i\in I}L_{i}=\dot{.}\oplus(L\mathrm{n}L\dot{.})\epsilon I$ ’
but sum does not in general distribute over infinite intersections (otherwise all logics
in NExtMIPC would have the finite model property; see below). Needless to say
also that like normal extensions of S4 all logics $L\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}$ admit the deduction
theorem in the following form:
$\Gamma,$ $\varphi\vdash_{L}*\psi$ iff $\Gamma\vdash_{L}*\square \varphiarrow\psi$ ,
where $\Delta\vdash_{L}*\chi$ means that $\chi$ is derivable in $L$ from $\Delta$ with the help of modus ponens
and necessitation.
Here are some important principles of MIPC which it shares with S4:
$\square$ ($p$ A $q$ ) $rightarrow\square p$ A $\square q$ , $\square prightarrow\square \square p,$ $\mathrm{O}prightarrow \mathrm{O}\mathrm{O}p,$ $(\mathrm{O}parrow\square q)arrow\square (parrow q)$ .
However, unlike S4, the necessity and possibility operators are not dual in MIPC:
$\neg \mathrm{O}\neg parrow\square p\not\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}$ , $\neg\square \neg parrow \mathrm{O}p\not\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}$ .
1As usual, $rightarrow$ and $\neg$ are defined as abbreviations: $\varphirightarrow\psi$ stands for $(\varphiarrow\psi)$ A $(\psiarrow\varphi)$ and $\neg\varphi$
for $\varphiarrow\perp;\mathrm{T}$ is an abbreviation for $\perparrow\perp$ .
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Note that actually we have
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus(\neg \mathrm{O}\neg parrow\square p)=\mathrm{S}5$ .
On the other hand,
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus(\neg\square \neg parrow \mathrm{O}p)\subset$ S5.
It is of interest that $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus(\neg\square \neg parrow \mathrm{O}p)$ and S5 contain exactly the same com-
pletely modalized formulas. More precisely, we call a formula $\varphi$ completely modalized
if every occurrence of a propositional variable in $\varphi$ is in the scope of some $\square$ or O.
Proposition 1 For every completely modalized formula $\varphi$ ,
$\varphi\in \mathrm{S}5$ iff $\varphi\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus(\neg\square \neg parrow \mathrm{O}p)$ .
For this reason we call $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus(\neg\square \neg parrow \mathrm{O}p)$ weak S5 and denote it by $\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5$ . It
is worth noting that the cardinality of $1^{\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5},\mathrm{S}5$ ] is that of continuum. For the map
$f$ : $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}arrow$ [ $\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5$ , S5] defined by $f(L)=\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5\oplus L$ can be shown to be an injection.
3 Semantics
Two equivalent Kripke-type semantics for MIPC were introduced by Ono [10], Esakia
(unpublished) and Fischer Servi [5]. Recall that a triple $F=\langle W,$ $R,$ $Q$ ) is called an
$Ono$ frame if $R$ is a partial order on $W\neq\emptyset$ and $Q$ a quasi-order on $W$ such that $R\subseteq Q$
and
$\forall x,$ $y\in W(xQy\Rightarrow\exists z\in W(xRz\ zE_{Qy}))$ , (1)
where $zE_{Qy}$ iff $zQy$ and $yQz$ , i.e., $z$ and $y$ belong to the same $Q$-cluster. The cluster
generated by $x$ will be denoted by $C(x)$ . In other words condition (1) means that if a
point $x$ has a $Q$-successor (in particular, an $R$-successor) $y$ then every point in $C(x)$
has an $R$-successor in $C(y)$ .
The relation $R$ in an Ono frame $F=(W,R,$ $Q\rangle$ is intended to interpret the in-
tuitionistic connectives, while $Q$ and $E_{Q}$ interpret the modal ones. More precisely,
having fixed an intuitionistic valuation in $\mathcal{F}$, i.e., an assignment of $R$-cones (see below)
to propositional variables, we define the truth-relation $\vdash$-for A and ${ }$ in the classical
way and $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}arrow,$ $\square$ and $\mathrm{O}$ put:
$\bullet$ $w\models\varphiarrow\psi$ iff $\forall v\in W$ (wRv&v\models \mbox{\boldmath $\varphi$}\Rightarrow v\models \psi );
$\bullet$ $w\models\square \varphi$ iff $\forall v\in W(wQv\Rightarrow v\models\varphi)$ ;
$\bullet$ $w\models \mathrm{O}\varphi$ iff $\exists v\in C(w)v\models\varphi$ .
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As we shall see below, there exist $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logics that are not complete with respect to
Ono frames. General frames for a wide class of intuitionistic modal logics were first
introduced in [17]. For logics over MIPC they can be defined in the following way.
A set $X\subseteq W$ in a quasi-order $(W, R)$ is said to be an $R$ -cone if
$\forall x,$ $y\in W$ (x\in X&xRy $\Rightarrow y\in X$).






A general frame for MIPC is a quadruple $(W, R, Q, P)$ , where $(W, R, Q)$ is an Ono
frame and $P$ a family of $R$-cones in $W$ which contains $\emptyset$ and is closed under $\cup,$ $\cap$ , and
the operations:
$Xarrow \mathrm{Y}=$ {$w\in W$ : $\forall v\in W$ (wRv&v\in X\Rightarrow v\in Y)} $=-((X-Y)\downarrow R)$ , (2)
$\square X=\{w\in W : \forall v\in W(wQv\Rightarrow v\in X)\}=-((-X)1_{Q})$ , (3)
$\mathrm{O}X=\{w\in W:\exists v\in C(w)v\in X\}=X\uparrow Q$ . (4)
$i^{\mathrm{F}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}}$ now on we will call general frames for MIPC simply frames, while Ono frames,
i.e., frames $\mathcal{F}^{\cdot}=(W, R, Q, \mathcal{P})$ with $\mathcal{P}$ containing all $R$-cones in $F$, will be called full
frames. Unlike full frames, valuations in general frames are restricted only to those
$R$-cones that belong to the set of possible values $P$ .
A frame $F=(W, R, Q, \mathcal{P})$ is refined when $\neg(xRy)$ only if there is $X\in \mathcal{P}$ such that
$x\in X$ and $y\not\in X$ , and $\neg(xQy)$ only if there is a $Q$ -cone $X\in P$ such that $x\in X$
and $y\not\in X$ . In this case we call $R$ and $Q$ refined. $F$ is compact if for all $\mathcal{X}\subseteq \mathcal{P}$ and
$\mathcal{Y}\subseteq\{-X : X\in \mathcal{P}\}$ , if $\mathcal{X}\cup \mathcal{Y}$ has the finite intersection property then $\cap(\mathcal{X}\cup \mathcal{Y})\neq\emptyset$ .
Finally, refined and compact frames are called descriptive.
It follows from [17] that we have
Theorem 2 Every $im$-logic $L$ is characterized by the class of descriptive frames for $L$ .
A frame $\mathcal{F}’=\langle W’,$ $R’,$ $Q’,$ $\mathcal{P}’$ ) is called a generated subframe of a frame $\mathcal{F}=$
( $W,$ $R,$ $Q,$ $P\rangle$ if $W’$ is a $Q$ -cone of $W,$ $R’$ and $Q’$ are the restrictions of $R$ and $Q$ to
$W’$ , respectively, and $\mathcal{P}’=\{X\cap W’ : X\in \mathcal{P}\}$ . Note that all generated subframes of
$\mathcal{F}=\langle W,$ $R,$ $Q,$ $P$ ) can be obtained in the following way: we take some $X\subseteq W$ , form its
$Q$-closure $W’=X\uparrow Q$ , define $R’$ and $Q’$ to be the restrictions of $R$ and $Q$ to $W’$ , respec-
tively, and put $\mathcal{P}’=\{\mathrm{Y}\cap W’ : Y\in \mathcal{P}\}$ . The resultant frame $\mathcal{F}’=(W’,$ $R’,$ $Q’,$ $\mathcal{P}’\rangle$ is
called the subframe of $\mathcal{F}$ generated by $X$ . A frame $F$ is said to be rooted if it coincides
with its subframe generated by a single point, a root of $F$.
Given two frames $\mathcal{F}^{\cdot}=(W,R,$ $Q,\mathcal{P}\rangle$ and $\mathcal{F}’=(W’,$ $R’,$ $Q’,$ $P’\rangle$ , a function $f$ from
$W$ into $W’$ is called a $p$-morphism from $\mathcal{F}$ into $\mathcal{F}’$ if for all $x\in W$ and $y\in W’$ ,
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$\bullet$ $f(x)R’y$ iff $\exists z\in W$ (xRz&f(z) $=y$);
$\bullet$ $f(x)Q’y$ iff $\exists z\in W$ (xQz&f(z) $=y$);
$\bullet$ $yQ’f(x)$ implies $\exists z\in W(zQx\ yR’f(z))$ ;
$\bullet$ $X\in \mathcal{P}’$ implies $f^{-1}(X)\in \mathcal{P}$ .
A surjective $p$-morphism is known also as a reduction. If $f$ is injective and for every
$X\in P$ there is $\mathrm{Y}\in P’$ such that $f(X)=f(W)\cap \mathrm{Y}$ then $F$ is (isomorphic to) the
subframe of $\mathcal{F}’$ generated by $f(W)$ .
The disjoint unions of frames are defined in exactly the same manner as in the
intuitionistic or classical modal cases.
For a frame $F$ denote by $Log(F)$ the set of all $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-formulas that are valid in $F$ .
It is easily checked that $Log(F)$ is an $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logic, and using standard arguments one can
prove the following
Theorem 3 (i) If $\mathcal{F}’$ is a generated subframe of $\mathcal{F}$, then $Log(F)\subseteq Log(\mathcal{F}’)$ .
(ii) If $\mathcal{F}’$ is a reduct of $F$, then $Log(F)\subseteq Log(F’)$ .
(iii) If $F$ is the disjoint union of a family $\{F_{i}\}_{iI}\in$ ’ then $Log( \mathcal{F}^{\cdot})=\bigcap_{i\in I}Log(\mathcal{F}_{i})$ .
We conclude this section with a few remarks on the semantics of some logics used
in the paper. First, let us recall that S5 is complete with respect to those Ono frames
in which $R$ is equality. WS5 is characterized by the class of Ono frames with $Q=E_{Q}$ .
The formula $\mathrm{O}parrow\square p$ is valid in $F=(W,R,$ $Q\rangle$ iff $R=Q$ . $\mathcal{F}\models\square (\square p\vee q)arrow(\square p\vee\square q)$
iff $xQy\Rightarrow\exists z\in X(xE_{Q}Z\ zRy)$ . The formula $\square \neg\neg parrow\neg\neg\square p$ is valid in a descriptive
frame $F$ iff $C(x)$ is $R$-discrete for every $x\in maxW$ , that is $y\in C(x)$ and $yRx$ imply
$y=x$ for every $x\in maxW$ . Here $maxW$ denotes the set of all $R$-maximal points
of $W^{2}$ . (Since $\mathcal{F}^{\cdot}$ is descriptive, $maxW\neq\#$ ). As was proved by Esakia, the formula
$\square ((parrow\square p)arrow\square p)arrow\square p$ is valid in a descriptive $F$ iff $X\subseteq(maxX\cap maxX\downarrow Q)\downarrow Q$
for every $X\in B(P)$ . Here $B(\mathcal{P})$ denotes the Boolean closure of $P$ .
4 $\mathrm{L}_{0}^{\mathrm{v}}$gics of finite depth and width
According to Segerberg’s Theorem from [13], all classical normal modal logics con-
taining K4 and characterized by frames of finite depth have the finite model property
(FMP, for short) in the sense that all of them are complete with respect to classes of
finite frames. The same result holds for finite depth logics in $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ ; this was proved
by Kuznetsov [8] or [9] and Komori [7]. Another interesting semantical parameter guar-
anteeing Kripke completeness of classical modal and intermediate logics is the width
of rooted frames. As was shown by Fine [4], all logics in $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}4$ characterized by
rooted frames of finite width are Kripke complete (though not necessarily have FMP).
2Recall that a point $x\in W$ is said to be $R$-maximal if $xRy$ implies $x=y$ for every $y\in W$ .
90
The same concerns the intermediate finite width logics, as was observed by Sobolev
[14].
The aim of this section is to introduce notions of depth and width of MIPC-frames
and find out what we can say about FMP and completeness of the corresponding finite
depth and finite width logics. Of course, in this case we are talking about completeness
with respect to full frames. Denote by $Fr(L)$ the class of all frames validating $L$ .
Since every MIPC-frame $F=(W,R, Q,\mathcal{P})$ has two relations $R$ and $Q$ , there are
two possibilities of defining its depth. Say that $F$ is of $R$-depth $n$ if it contains an
$R$-chain $x_{1}R\ldots R_{X_{n}}$ of $n$ distinct points but no $R$-chain of greater length. $F$ is of
$Q$-depth $n$ if it contains a $Q$ -chain $x_{1}Q\ldots Qx_{n}$ of $n$ points from distinct $Q$-clusters but
no such chain of greater length. An $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logic $L$ is said to be of $R$-depth $n$ if there exists
a frame $F\in Fr(L)$ of $R$-depth $n$ but there is no $F\in Fr(L)$ of greater depth. $L$ is
called a finite $R$-depth logic if $L$ is alogic of $R$-depth $n$ , for some $n<\omega$ . Finite Q-depth
logics are defined analogously.
Let us consider two sequences of formulas:
$bd_{0}=\perp$ ;
$bd_{n}=q_{n}(q_{n}arrow bd_{n-1})$ , for $n\geq 1$ .
$bd_{0}^{\mathrm{O}}=\perp$ ;
$bd_{n}^{\mathrm{O}}=\square q_{n}(\square q_{n}arrow bd_{n-}^{\mathrm{O}})1$
’ for $n\geq 1$ .
The following syntactical characterization of logics of $R$-depth ( $Q$-depth) $n$ holds
Proposition 4 (i) An $im$-logic $L$ is of $R$ -depth $n$ iff $bd_{n}\in L$ and $bd_{n-1}\not\in L$ .
(ii) An $im$-logic $L$ is of $Q$ -depth $n$ iff $bd_{n}^{\mathrm{o}}\in L$ and $bd_{n-1}^{\mathrm{O}}\not\in L$ .
Denote by $D_{fin}^{R}$ and $D_{fin}^{Q}$ the classes of all finite $R$-depth and finite $Q$ -depth im-
logics, respectively. It should be clear that $D_{fin}^{R}\subset D_{jin}^{Q}$ . As in the case of $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}4$ , one
can show that every logic in $D_{fin}^{R}$ enjoys FMP. However, this is not the case for logics
of finite $Q$-depth, even for those of $Q$-depth 1. Indeed, all logics in $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}5$ are of Q-
depth 1. It is not hard to see now that if $L$ is Kripke incomplete superintuitionistic logic
then $\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5\oplus L$ is not complete with respect to the Ono semantics (and in particular
does not have FMP). Moreover, we have the following
Theorem 5 (i) If a logic $L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ does not have $FMP$ then no logic in the interval
$[\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{c}\oplus L,\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5\oplus L]$ has $FMP$.
(ii) If a logic $L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ is Ifripke incomplete, then no logic in the interval
$[\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{C}\oplus L, \mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5\oplus L]$ is complete with respect to the $Ono$ semantics.
In particular, the logics $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus bd_{n}^{\mathrm{O}}$ are incomplete (do not have FMP) if
$L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ is incomplete (does not have FMP). Consequently, we obtain
91
Theorem 6 (i) Every $im$-logic offinite $R$ -depth $e$njoys $FMP$, and hence, is $Ono$ com-
plete.
(ii) For every $n\leq\omega_{J}$ there exists a continuum of logics of $Q$ -depth $n$ that are not
complete with respect to the $Ono$ semantics (in particular, do not have $FMP$).
Now let us turn to $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logics of finite width. Say that a frame $\mathcal{F}^{\cdot}$ is of $R$-width (Q-
width) $n$ , if there is an $R$-rooted ( $Q$ -rooted) subframe of $\mathcal{F}^{\cdot}$ containing an R-antichain
( $Q$-antichain) of $n$ points, but no $R$-rooted ( $Q$ -rooted) subframe of $\mathcal{F}$ contains an R-
antichain ( $Q$-antichain) with $\geq n$ points. An $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logic is said to be of $R$-width (Q-width)
$n$ if there exists a frame $F\in Fr(L)$ of $R$-width ( $Q$-width) $n$ but there is no $\mathcal{F}\in Fr(L)$
of greater width. $L$ is called a finite $R$ -width logic if $L$ is a logic of $R$-width $n$ , for some
$n<\omega$ . Finite $Q$-width logics are defined analogously.
Consider two sequences of formulas:
$bw_{n}=\mathrm{V}_{i=0}^{n}(p_{i}arrow _{j\neq ip_{j}})$ , for $n\geq 1$ ,
$bw_{n}^{\mathrm{o}}=\mathrm{v}_{i=0}^{n}(\square p_{i}arrow _{j\neq i}\square pj)$ , for $n\geq 1$ .
The following syntactical characterization of $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logics of $R$-width ( $Q$-width) $n$ holds.
Theorem 7 (i) An $im$-logic $L$ is of $R$ -width $n$ iff $bw_{n}\in L$ and $bw_{n-1}\not\in L$ .
(ii) An $im$-logic $L$ is of $Q$ -width $n$ iff $bw_{n}^{\mathrm{o}}\in L$ and $bw_{n-1}^{\mathrm{O}}\not\in L$ .
Denote by $\mathcal{W}_{fin}^{R}$ and $\mathcal{W}_{fin}^{Q}$ the classes of all finite $R$-width logics and all finite
$Q$ -width logics, respectively. Clearly, $\mathcal{W}_{fin}^{R}\subset \mathcal{W}_{fin}^{Q}$ .
As was shown by Sobolev [14], there exits a logic $L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ of $R$-width 2 which
does not have FMP. Since the logic $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus(\mathrm{O}parrow\square p)$ does not have FMP
(is Ono incomplete) whenever $L$ does not have FMP (is Kripke incomplete), we can
conclude that not every $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logic of finite $R$-width enjoys FMP. Moreover, we have the
following
Theorem 8 (i) If a logic $L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ does not have $FMP$ then no logic in the interval
$[\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{C}\oplus L, \mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus(\mathrm{O}parrow\square p)]$
has $FMP$.
(ii) If a logic $L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ is $Ii’ri_{F}ke$ incomplete then no logic in the interval
$[\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{C}\oplus L, \mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus(\mathrm{O}parrow\square p)]$
is $Ono$ complete.
In particular, the logics
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus\square \neg\neg parrow\neg\neg\square p$
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and
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus\square ((parrow\square p)arrow\square p)arrow\square p$
are Ono incomplete (do not enjoy FMP) whenever $L\in \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ is Kripke incomplete
(does not have FMP). Note that the axiom of the former logic is the modal analogue
of Kuroda’s formula
$\forall x\neg\neg P(x)arrow\neg\neg\forall xP(X)$ ,
and the axiom of the latter is the modal analogue of Casari’s formula
$\forall x((P(x)arrow\forall xP(x))arrow\forall xP(x))arrow\forall xP(x)$ .
Returning to $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logics of $Q$-width $n$ , we clearly have that every logic in $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{W}\mathrm{s}5$
is of $Q$-width 1. So there is a continuum of $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logics of $Q$-width 1 which are Ono
incomplete.
To sum up, we have the following
Theorem 9 (i) For every $n\geq 2$ , there exists an $im$-logic of $R$-width $n$ without $FMP$.
(ii) For every $n\leq\omega$ , there exists a continuum of $im$-logics of $Q$ -width $n$ which are
not complete with respect to the $Ono$ semantics.
It would be of great interest to know whether all finite $R$-width logics are Ono
complete. We are working on this problem now, and our conjecture is that all of them
are complete. Another important problem is to generalize the Bull-Fine Theorem on
the finite model property and decidability of logics in $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{S}4.3$ to $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$-logics of R-width
1.
We conclude this note with a few related completeness results. They are established
by the canonical model and filtration techniques. We remind the reader that an im-
logic $L$ is called $d$-persistent, if for every descriptive frame $F$ for $L$ , the underlying
full frame of $F$ also validates $L$ . Clearly, every $\mathrm{d}$-persistent logic is Ono complete. It
should be clear also that $\mathrm{d}$-persistence is preserved under sums of logics.
Proposition 10 (i) MIPC is d-persistent.
(ii) For every $d$-persistent logic $L\in \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t},$ $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L$ is $d$-persistent too. $In$
particular, the logics $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus bw_{n}$ are $d$-persistent and complete.
(iii) $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus\square (\square p\vee q)arrow(\square p\square q)$ is $d$ -persistent (the axiom of this logic is the
modal analogue of the constant domain axiom $\forall x(P(x)Q)arrow(\forall xP(x)Q))$ .
(iv) $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus\square \neg\neg parrow\neg\neg\square p$ is d-persistent.
(v) $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus y_{n}$ is $d$-persistent for every $n\geq 1$ , where $y_{0}=\perp,$ $y_{n}=\square (p_{n}(p_{n}arrow$
$y_{n-1}))$ are the modal analogues of Yokota’s formulas $P_{0}^{+}=\perp,$ $P_{n}^{+}=\forall x(p_{n}(X)$
$(p_{n}(x)arrow P_{n-1}^{+}))^{3}$.
3The formula $y_{n}$ is valid in an Ono frame iff it is of $R$-depth $n$ and all $Q$-clusters in it are R-discrete,
i.e., $y\in C(x)$ and $yRx$ imply $y=x$ .
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An example of alogic that is not $d$-persistent is $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{c}\oplus\square ((parrow\square p)arrow\square p)arrow\square p$,
as was observed (but not published) by Esakia.
Using a combination of the filtration methods for superintuitionistic logics and
classical modal logics (for an exposition of various filtration techniques consult [3]) one
can show the following
Theorem 11 If a logic $L\in \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ admits filtration, then the logics $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L_{J}$
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L\oplus\square (\square pq)arrow(\square p\square q)$ , and $\mathrm{W}\mathrm{S}5\oplus L$ admit filtration as well.
One of consequences of this theorem is that $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus bw_{n}$ has FMP.
We are also tempted to conjecture that if $L\in \mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ has FMP (is Kripke complete)
then $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}\oplus L$ also enjoys FMP (respectively, is Ono complete).
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